Friday, October 22 12-2 pm
Nada Matta and Rene Rojas: The Strategic Logic of Hamas’ Suicide Terror During the Second Intifada
After reviewing the dominant theories of suicide bombings and pointing out their shortcomings, this paper will present an alternative rational-strategic model of terrorism. Before doing so, however, some space will be dedicated to discussing and clarifying the assumptions that underpin the existing literature on the subject. Once this is taken care of and our case selection has been justified, the paper will develop our explanation for the use of suicide terror by Hamas during the Al-Aksa Intifada. We then proceed to carefully lay out our model, linking it to our underlying set of assumptions. Next, we offer a presentation of the institutional and political context that promoted the use of this tactic by Hamas. The final empirical section of the paper will present evidence of Hamas’ strategic decision-making within this context. Relying on the public statements of the Hamas leadership during the Intifada, we show that the group’s use of suicide terror, though subject to a complex array of influences and often responding to countervailing pressures, was governed by rational calculations linked to the strategic aim of weakening the occupation. Specifically, we demonstrate that suicide attacks were deployed in order to promote a resistance pole that could challenge the dominance of the Palestinian Authority and therefore generate the capacity to favorably shift the balance of forces vis-à-vis Israel. To make the most persuasive case possible for a rational-strategic use of suicide bombings, we pay close attention to a particular juncture of the Al-Aksa Intifada (2003-2004) during which the logic of the tactic can be most called into question.